Legal Cases
and Statutes
Read our comprehensive research on domestic, national, and international legal cases and statutes. Whether you're a budding legal scholar or a seasoned enthusiast, this section provides in-depth analysis of legislation and judicial decisions.
From Tragedy to Exoneration: The Tammy Marquardt Case and Forensic Failure
By Aadil Monir - Feb 17, 2025
Case Summary
On October 9, 1993, Tammy Marquardt, a young mother, heard her two-and-a-half-year-old son, Kenneth, struggling. Rushing to his room, she discovered him entangled in bedsheets, his face turning pale. Panicked, she attempted to free him and perform CPR, but struggled in her distress. She quickly dialed 911, and paramedics transported Kenneth to the hospital. Despite medical efforts, Kenneth passed away three days later. To make matters worse for Ms. Marquardt, Dr. Charles Smith, a highly regarded forensic pathologist at the time asserted—without definitive medical proof—that Kenneth had been suffocated, basing his conclusion on petechial hemorrhages while disregarding alternative medical explanations." [1]. This medical claim enabled the prosecution to allege that Ms. Marquardt had murdered her child by smothering him–contrary to her claim of innocence. Ultimately, on October 24, 1995, she was convicted of second-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment under Section 235 of the Criminal Code of Canada [4].
With the help of her defense counsel, she filed an appeal in 1998, imploring the court to consider manslaughter, as defined in Section 234 of the Criminal Code of Canada–the idea that Ms. Marquardt might be guilty of a “culpable homicide that is not murder or infanticide” [4]. This was an option the trial judge did not initially consider. Arguing for manslaughter would effectively challenge whether she intended to kill, potentially resulting in a lower sentence [2]. Despite maintaining her claim of innocence, she desperately presented an appeal to the Ontario Court of Appeal (which did not challenge Dr. Smith’s findings) suggesting that:
She unlawfully caused her son’s death but did not intend to kill him.
Dr. Smith’s findings were accepted, implying the death resulted from smothering.
In Response, the Court dismissed the appeal, and she remained imprisoned–due to a lack of financial resources to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada. Years later, it emerged that Dr. Smith had made a general practice of falsifying reports, hiding evidence, and making claims based on “junk science.” [3]. In particular, a review found that his work was flawed in 20 of 40 child-death cases, and that his claim of asphyxia in Kenneth’s death was unsubstantiated [1].
Significance
This culminated in The Court of Appeal ordering a new trial once significant doubt was cast on the accuracy of Dr. Smith’s testimony, leading the Crown to withdraw all charges and decide not to proceed with a new trial in 2011– effectively exonerating Ms. Marquardt. By this time, she had already served about 13 years in prison for a crime she did not commit. Presiding Justice, Michael Brown stated that, “I can't imagine what it must have been like for you to have to bear the burden of not only losing your child, Kenneth, but also to have had to deal with being convicted of killing your son... and spending 13 years in jail as a result.” [3]. In addition to the judge’s apology, Ms. Marquardt received $250,000 in compensation. This case highlights several issues within the Canadian Legal System: for example, how Ms. Marquardt’s defense council did not challenge the basis of Dr. Smith’s testimony during her 1998 Appeal, fundamentally conceding fault rather than maintaining her claim of innocence; or how she was unable to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, due to financial constraints. It also raises the broader question of whether expert witnesses align more with the prosecution, thereby increasing the pressure on accused persons to accept plea deals.
References
AI Statement: OpenAI’s language tools were used to generate synonyms, correct grammatical issues, and adjust sentence structure, ensuring greater clarity for the reader
[1] Kent Roach, Wrongful Convictions in Canada, 80 U. Cin. L. Rev. (2013) Available at: https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol80/iss4/19
“For examples of guilty pleas being subsequently overturned in cases involving Dr. Smith see R. v. Sheratt Robinson, 2009 ONCA 886 (Can.); R. v. C.F., 2010 ONCA 691 (Can.); R. v. C.M., 2010 ONCA 690 (Can.); R. v. Kumar, 2011 ONCA 120 (Can.); R. v. Brant, 2011 ONCA 362 (Can.) (parents pled guilty to reduced homicide in the child’s death in the face of forensic pathology evidence later shown to be unreliable).”
[2] Further Resources to explore: https://www.innocencecanada.com/the-latest/exoneration/tammy-marquardt/
[3] https://www.wrongfulconvictions.ca/cases/tammy-marquardt
[4] Canadian Criminal Code 1985 https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/c-46/page-36.html
United States v. Causby: Property in the Age of Aviation
By Sriharsha Madireddy - Feb 17, 2025
Photo sourced from Wikimedia Commons
Case Summary
The case of United States v. Causby, decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1946, addressed a fundamental question in property and air transportation law: To what extent do property owners control the airspace above their land? The case arose when Thomas Lee Causby, a North Carolina farmer, sued the federal government for damages, arguing that military aircraft from a nearby airport flew so low over his property that they rendered his land unusable. Causby contended that the flights caused unbearable noise, frightened his livestock—leading to the death of his chickens—which significantly diminished his property’s value (United States v. Causby, 1946). At the center of the case was the legal principle of ad coelum, a doctrine from common law that claimed property ownership extended from the depths to the heavens. Although, the rapid development of aviation in the 20th century made this interpretation indeterminate. The government argued that the flights traveled in navigable airspace, as defined by the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, and that private property rights could not extend indefinitely into the sky.
In a landmark 5-2 decision, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of Causby, stating that although the air above a property is part of the public domain for air travel, property owners maintain rights to the immediate airspace necessary for the use and enjoyment of their land. Writing for the majority, Justice William O. Douglas argued that frequent low-altitude flights that interfere with a landowner’s ability to use and enjoy their property constitute a taking under the Fifth Amendment, requiring just compensation. The Court did not overturn the public right to air travel but clarified that government use of airspace must not impose unreasonable burdens on landowners (Cahoon, 1990).
The Significance
United States v. Causby remains a foundational case in airspace and property law, shaping the legal understanding of aviation’s impact on private property. The ruling established that while the public has a right to use navigable airspace, there are limits to government intrusion when flights create direct harm to landowners. This decision was instrumental in defining how courts balance property rights with the needs of modern air travel. The case also highlights the broader tension between technological advancements and traditional legal principles. Before United States v. Causby, the idea of absolute property rights—where ownership extended indefinitely into the air—aligned with common law traditions. However, the rise of aviation required a reassessment of this principle. The ruling aligned with pragmatic legal realism, recognizing that property rights must be adapted to contemporary realities rather than adhering strictly to antiquated doctrines. As a result, this case shaped airspace regulations by clarifying government control limits and private landowner rights, setting a precedent for compensation when government airspace use disrupts property.
The Causby decision also reflects legal pragmatism and constitutional interpretation, balancing precedent with societal needs. Moreover, Justice Douglas’s opinion advocated legal adaptation to technological progress, while Justice Black’s dissent cautioned against restricting aviation growth. This debate highlights the tension between preserving traditional property rights and embracing flexible legal frameworks to address modern challenges (Cahoon, 1990). By recognizing that landowners have a right to control the immediate airspace necessary for the use and enjoyment of their property, the Supreme Court struck a balance between private property rights and the needs of an expanding aviation industry.
References
United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
Cahoon, C. (1990). Low Altitude Airspace: A property rights no-man’s land. The Journal of Air Law and Commerce, 56(1), 157-198.
Standards & Speculation: An Introduction to Medical Malpractice Law through the lens of Armstrong v. Ward (2021)
By Aadil Monir - Dec 22, 2024
Photo by Piron Guillaume on Unsplash
Introduction to Medical Malpractice Law
Contemporary medical malpractice law evaluates a healthcare practitioner’s actions against the objective standards set to govern the profession, such as those established by the Royal College of Physicians & Surgeons of Canada [1]. Courts assess how a similarly situated practitioner would reasonably be expected to act under comparable circumstances. If a healthcare practitioner fails to meet the required standard of care, they may be found liable under the Negligence Act 1990 RSO 1990, c N.1 in Ontario, for breaching their duty of care, provided the breach caused harm to the patient–fulfilling the chain of causation [2]. Another key element in medical malpractice cases is proving the claim on the balance of probabilities, meaning it must be more than 50% likely to be true in the judgment of the court.
This standard differs from criminal cases, where the burden of proof lies with the Crown to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. As a result, philosophically appealing arguments, such as those addressing the tension between the spirit and the letter of the law as illustrated in the piece of Riggs v Palmer, can be strategically utilized to reinforce a case in medical malpractice. However, as this analysis will demonstrate, the courts are not obligated to entertain such arguments unless they are supported by a robust evidentiary foundation, thereby delineating the boundaries of permissible speculation in this context.
To successfully establish a medical malpractice claim in Ontario, the following four elements must be proven in a connected chain:
The negligent party, or the defendant, owed a duty of care to the injured party
This duty is inherent in patient-doctor relationships, and ensures that healthcare providers act in the best interest of the patient, and avoid actions that could foreseeably cause harm.
The negligent party breached the applicable standard of care
A breach occurs when a healthcare provider fails to meet the objective standard of care expected of a reasonable professional in similar circumstances, whether through an act or omission.
The injured party sustained damages; and
The injured party must demonstrate actual harm resulting from the breach, such as a physical injury or psychological-trauma. Without concrete evidence of damages, the claim cannot proceed as negligence alone does not impose liability.
The damages were caused by the negligent party’s negligence (Proximate Causation)
This element links the breach of duty to the harm suffered by the aggrieved party, and is evaluated through two components:
Factual Causation: Deals with determining whether the harm would not have occurred, “but for” defendants actions. If the breach of duty directly led to the harm, the defendant may be factually liable.
Legal Causation: Assessing whether the harm was reasonably foreseeable as a result of the breach.
All four elements are necessary to establish a medical malpractice claim. Failure at any stage severs the chain of causation and absolves the defendant of liability. It is also worth noting, external factors, such as the conduct of another party can interrupt the chain, as illustrated in the BC case of Thompson et al. v. Toorenburgh et al., 1973 CanLII 1149 (BC CA). In this case, the court found that subsequent medical treatment did not sever the chain of causation, as the initial negligence remained the proximate cause of death [3].
Case Summary
In February 2010, Karen Armstrong underwent surgery performed by Dr. Colin Ward. Shortly, after the procedure, she experienced severe pain. Tests revealed a ureteric injury, which eventually necessitated the removal of her left kidney. At trial in January 2018, Armstrong argued that Dr. Ward had operated a LigaSure cautery device too close to her ureter. Conversely, Dr. Ward argued that he maintained a safe distance, consistent with the standards of a reasonable surgeon. He attributed the injury to a non-negligent factor–scar tissue formation. Resultantly, the court was tasked with addressing two primary issues:
(a) Whether the surgeon’s conduct met the objectively established standard of care, as opposed to Dr. Ward’s subjective belief in the propriety of his actions.
(b) Whether the defence could invoke non-negligent factors such as scar tissue formation, without providing an evidentiary foundation to challenge legal causation. Specifically, could Dr. Ward argue that the chain of causation was broken, attributing the ureteric injury to scar tissue, as opposed to his own conduct, without presenting sound evidence to support his claim?
Lower Court Rulings
April 16, 2018 – Ontario Superior Court of Justice (2018 ONSC 2439, CV-15-0614):
At trial, Justice Mulligan ruled that Dr. Ward failed to meet the standard of care. He concluded that “Dr. Ward had come within one to two millimetres of the ureter—less than the generally accepted two-millimeter threshold—causing the injury” [4].December 6, 2019 – Court of Appeal for Ontario (2019 ONCA 963, C65404):
The majority found that Justice Mulligan had erred in his application of the standard. They stated that had the trial judge “applied the law correctly, he would have found that Dr. Ward is not liable” in light of non-negligent factors e.g scar tissue formation. However, Justice Katherine van Rensburg dissented, arguing that the Superior Court judge’s reasoning, centered on the objective standard rather than the surgeon’s subjective view, was sound [5].
Supreme Court of Canada’s Decision
On January 18, 2021, the Supreme Court of Canada restored the Ontario Superior court’s decision, endorsing Justice van Rensburg’s dissent. The Court emphasized that understanding how the injury occurred was necessary to assess whether Dr. Ward’s actions met the objective measure of care expected. It also held that courts need not entertain speculative non-negligent causes without sound evidence. Defendants must present substantiated evidence at trial if they wish to propose alternate explanations for the injury–challenging the chain of causation, as opposed to relying on speculatory arguments [6].
Significance
The case of Armstrong v. Ward underscores two important principles. First, it reaffirms that the standard of care in medical negligence cases is objective, requiring courts to evaluate a physician's actions against the established practices of their professional peers, rather than the practitioner’s subjective intentions or beliefs. The decision emphasizes that factual analysis—such as the application of "but-for" tests—can determine whether the objective standard was met. Secondly, while the burden of proof in medical malpractice cases must be met on the balance of probabilities (i.e., greater than 50%), the court is not obligated to consider speculative non-negligent causes unless supported by credible evidence. Essentially, this case clarifies that unsupported alternative theories will not shift the burden of proof away from the defendant–delineating the limits of speculation in medical malpractice claims.
Application to Moot Court
The principles established in Armstrong v. Ward (2021) provide valuable insights for moot court arguments. The case reinforces the objective standard of care, emphasizing that a healthcare practitioner’s subjective belief in acting in the patient’s best interest does not suffice if their actions deviate from professional expectations. For example, prescribing treatment based on personal preferences or trends instead of adhering to established procedural guidelines may constitute a breach of duty. Similarly, delaying necessary action while foreseeing that the delay could exacerbate harm may amount to proximate causation. The decision also highlights the limits of speculative defenses. For instance, attributing harm to a third party, such as a psychiatrist, requires substantial evidence linking that party’s conduct to the injury. In the absence of such evidence, liability is likely to remain with the primary defendant, even as the burden of proof is on the balance of probabilities. However, compelling evidence that a third party directly caused the harm may sever the chain of causation, potentially mitigating the accused party’s liability.
In moot court, participants might strategically acknowledge a breach of duty while arguing that the proximate cause lies with a third party, thereby demonstrating that the original breach did not directly result in the injury. Additionally, referencing analogous case law can provide circumstantial evidence to support the argument, where the facts and subsequent ruling are similar. While not directly binding, such cases illustrate how similar legal issues have been interpreted, offering context for broader legal principles. This comparative approach may assist judges in evaluating the application of legal doctrines within the case’s specific circumstances. Additionally, examining various common law defences in established Canadian case law such–as contributory negligence, experience, practicality, risk-benefit analysis and common practice–equips participants with the necessary tools to construct thorough and persuasive legal arguments [7].
References
AI Statement: OpenAI’s language tools were used to generate synonyms, correct grammatical issues, and adjust sentence structure, ensuring greater clarity for the reader
[1]Standard of Care for Health Care Professionals [Sylvester v. Crits et al., 1956 CanLII 34 (ON CA)]
https://www.pacificmedicallaw.ca/blog/the-standard-of-care/
[2] Negligence Act 1990
https://www.canlii.org/en/on/laws/stat/rso-1990-c-n1/latest/rso-1990-c-n1.html
[3] Thompson et al. v. Toorenburgh et al., 1973 CanLII 1149 (BC CA)
[4] 2019 Case
[https://www.canlii.org/en/on/onca/doc/2019/2019onca963/2019onca963.html
[5] Commentary
https://otlablog.com/armstrong-v-ward-2021-scc-1/
[6] SCC Decision
https://www.scc-csc.ca/case-dossier/info/sum-som-eng.aspx?cas=39049&pedisable=true; https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/2021/2021scc1/2021scc1.html
[7] Common law defenses based on British Negligence Cases ~ Sourced from Cambridge A-Level Law Textbook: Fry, J., Wilshire, T., Wortley, R., Price, N., Martin, J. (2021). Cambridge International AS and A Level Law Second Edition. United Kingdom: Hodder Education.
(Kent v Griffiths) - Unjustified ambulance delays constitute a breach of duty of care.
(Shakoor v Situ) - Competence assessed in comparison to a reasonable practitioner within the same domain.
(Bolam v Friern Hospital) - Standard of care assessed based on the endorsement of competent medical opinion.
(Bolton v Stone) - No liability for exceedingly unusual and unpredictable circumstances
(Latimer v AEC Ltd) – Reasonable precautions mitigate responsibility notwithstanding lingering hazards.
(Thompson v Ship Repairs) - Something being common practice cannot be used as a defence
Riggs v. Palmer: A Landmark Case in Legal Philosophy
By Sriharsha Madireddy - Dec 22, 2024
Photo by Álvaro Serrano on Unsplash
Case Summary
The case of Riggs v. Palmer, decided by the New York Court of Appeals in 1889, raises a profound legal and moral question: Can someone profit from their own wrongdoing? This case involved Elmer Palmer, who murdered his grandfather, Francis Palmer, to secure his inheritance. At the time, New York’s statute of wills did not explicitly bar a murderer from inheriting, leaving the court to determine whether Elmer should benefit from his crime. After Elmer’s conviction for second-degree murder, his aunts, Cecelia and Lorette, sued to block his inheritance. In a landmark decision, the majority held that Elmer could not inherit.
Writing for the court, Judge Robert Earl, reasoned that while the statute of wills did not explicitly address such situations, the equitable principle that “no one should be allowed to profit from their own wrongdoing” was invoked in dissent. He reasoned that courts must interpret the law in line with principles of justice, prioritizing the law’s purpose–the spirit of the law–over its literal letter, which is the plain meaning of statute (Beehler, 1990). Earl’s reasoning reflects a natural law perspective, emphasizing that moral principles must shape the application of legal rules, to avoid absurd results. In dissent, Judge John Clinton Gray adhered strictly to the plain interpretation of the statute. He argued that the judiciary’s duty was to apply the statute as written, without imposing conditions the legislature did not originally include. Judge Gray warned of the dangers of judicial overreach, asserting that any necessary changes to the law should come from the legislature (Meyer, 2020).
The Significance
Riggs v. Palmer highlights the enduring debate between the spirit and the letter of the law, and the broader debate between interpretivism and legal positivism. Judge Earl’s majority opinion reflects an interpretive approach, advocated by thinkers like Ronald Dworkin and Lon L. Fuller, who argue that moral principles must guide legal interpretation to achieve just outcomes. By preventing Elmer from profiting from his crime, Judge Earl upheld the law’s spirit over its letter. In contrast, Judge Gray’s dissent aligns with legal positivism, as articulated by John Austin, which insists on strict adherence to statutory language (Green and Adams, 2019). Judge Gray’s concern about judicial overreach echoes positivist ideals, emphasizing that judges should apply laws as written, leaving changes to the legislature. The case also reflects the intersections of law, morality, and public sentiment. As scholar William B. Meyer notes, public outrage over Elmer Palmer’s actions likely influenced the court’s decision. Ultimately, this convergence of legal principles and societal values ensures that Riggs v. Palmer remains a seminal example of how moral reasoning and judicial discretion can shape law.
References
Beehler, R. (1990). Legal positivism, social rules, and Riggs v. Palmer. Law and Philosophy, 9(3), 285-293.
Meyer, W. B. (2020). The background to Riggs v. Palmer. American Journal of Legal History, 60(1), 48-75.
Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506 (1889).
Dworkin, R. (1986). Law’s Empire. Harvard University Press.
Green, Leslie and Thomas Adams, "Legal Positivism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2019 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/legal-positivism/>.
Donoghue v Stevenson: A Cornerstone of Tort Law – Establishing the Duty of Care and the Neighbour Principle
By Aadil Monir - Oct 18, 2024
Photo by Krzysztof Niewolny on Unsplash
Case Summary
Contemporary tort laws, such as negligence, require that a breach of duty be followed by foreseeable harm to compensate for damages. The development of English tort law stems from the 1932 case of Donoghue v Stevenson. In 1928, Mrs. Donoghue visited a cafe in Paisley, Scotland, with a friend and consumed half a ginger beer only to discover the decomposed remains of a snail in the bottle, leading to shock and severe gastroenteritis. However, her friend had purchased the ginger beer manufactured by Stevenson, leaving Mrs. Donoghue without a contractual relationship with the manufacturer. At the time, negligence law held that a duty of care arose only from a contractual relationship between the parties (Law Teacher, 2013).
This meant that Mrs. Donoghue could not claim a breach of warranty under existing law for the damages she suffered. Instead, she filed a claim against Stevenson for negligence, asserting that a duty of care should be owed to consumers irrespective of contractual ties. The Scottish courts ultimately ruled against Mrs. Donoghue, referencing the case of Mullen v AG Barr & Co., which established that a contractual relationship must exist in order for manufacturers to owe a duty of care to consumers (CanLII, 2011). Persisting, Mrs. Donoghue appealed directly to the House of Lords – renamed the UK Supreme Court post-2009.
The Significance
In a landmark 3:2 decision, the House of Lords ruled in favor of Mrs. Donoghue, establishing that a duty of care was owed to consumers, irrespective of a direct contractual relationship. The leading judge, Lord Atkin, stated that, “you must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure your neighbor” (Law Teacher, 2013). This judgment formed the basis of the Neighbor Principle, a cornerstone of tort law, where individuals are held accountable for actions that foreseeably impact those around them to whom they owe a duty of care. This decision set a precedent critical in the development of modern-day tort laws such as medical malpractice, negligence & occupiers’ liability.
References
AI Statement: OpenAI’s language tools were used to generate synonyms, correct grammatical issues, and adjust sentence structure, ensuring greater clarity for the reader
CanLII. (2011). Mullen v AG Barr & Co. Retrieved from https://www.canlii.org/en/commentary/doc/2011CanLIIDocs146#!fragment/zoupio-_Toc3Page1/BQCwhgziBcwMYgK4DsDWszIQewE4BUBTADwBdoAvbRABwEtsBaAfX2zgGYAFMAc0ICMASgA0ybKUIQAiokK4AntADkykREJhcCWfKWr1m7SADKeUgCElAJQCiAGVsA1AIIA5AMK2RpMACNoUnYhISA
Law Teacher. (2013, November). Donoghue v Stevenson Case Summary. Retrieved from https://www.lawteacher.net/cases/donoghue-v-stevenson.php?vref=1
Donoghue v Stevenson, [1932] UKHL 100
The Sparrow Case: The Extent and Limits of Indigenous rights
By Sriharsha Madireddy - Oct 18, 2024
R. v. Sparrow - What is the Sparrow Case?
The R. v. Sparrow case, decided by the Supreme Court of Canada in 1990, was a landmark ruling that helped define the scope of Indigenous rights under Section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. This case originated when Ronald Sparrow, a member of the Musqueam Nation, was charged with using a fishing net longer than what was allowed under his food fishing license. Sparrow defended his actions by claiming that he was exercising his inherent Indigenous right to fish, which had been protected under the newly enacted Section 35. The case raised significant questions about the extent of government regulation on Indigenous rights and the criteria under which those rights could be restricted (SCC cases).
The Significance of Section 35
Section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 states that “the existing Aboriginal and treaty rights of the Aboriginal peoples of Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed” (SCC cases). While this provision promised protection for Indigenous culture and practices, R. v. Sparrow was the first case to test its limits. The Supreme Court ruled that Sparrow’s fishing rights, as part of the Musqueam Nation’s traditions, had not been extinguished by past regulations. However, the Court also concluded that Indigenous rights are not absolute and can be regulated under strict conditions.
The Sparrow Test
The Sparrow case introduced a test to determine when an Aboriginal right is infringed and if that infringement can be justified (Indigenous Foundations).
Infringement: A government action infringes on an Aboriginal right if it:
Imposes undue hardship.
Is deemed unreasonable by the court.
Prevents the right-holder from exercising the right.
Justification: An infringement may be justified if:
It serves a valid legislative objective, like conservation of natural resources.
There has been minimal infringement to achieve the objective.
Fair compensation is provided, if applicable.
Aboriginal groups were consulted or at least informed.
Final Remarks
A key development in Sparrow was the Court’s first definition of ‘existing’ Aboriginal rights as those that were in place when the Constitution came into effect (Hellinga, 2020). However, the Sparrow decision confirmed that Aboriginal rights are not absolute; they can be infringed if the government provides legal justification. While considered a victory for recognizing Aboriginal rights, it is overshadowed by the reluctance of the Court in solidifying those rights. This decision speaks to the broader environment in Canada of the need to assimilate Indigenous peoples into the hegemonic Western traditions.
References
Hellinga, E. (2020, February 6). The legacy of R v sparrow. TheCourt.ca. https://www.thecourt.ca/the-legacy-of-r-v-sparrow/
R. V. Sparrow - SCC cases. (n.d.). https://scc-csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/item/609/index.do
Sparrow case. indigenousfoundations. (n.d.). https://indigenousfoundations.web.arts.ubc.ca/sparrow_case/
Photo by Chris LeBoutillier on Unsplash
Canada's Carbon Tax under the Liberal Government
By Aadil Monir - June 9th, 2024
What is the Federal Carbon Tax?
In 2019, the government of Canada imposed a federal carbon tax, officially titled the "Federal Carbon Pricing System," to support their aim of reducing greenhouse gas emissions. This was imposed in line with the Pan-Canadian Framework on Clean Growth and Climate Change, encouraging individuals to adopt cleaner energy practices and reduce environmental pollution (‘Pan-Canadian Framework’).
The carbon tax applies to fossil fuels such as gasoline, diesel, natural gas, and home heating fuel. This started at $20 per tonne of CO2 in 2019 and was set to increase by $10 annually, reaching $50 per tonne in 2022 (“Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act: Annual Report for 2019). In essence, the progressive aspect of this policy is designed to avoid negatively impacting the economy.
What does this mean?
The federal carbon tax helps Canada achieve its climate aims by discouraging the consumption of fossil fuels, which lead to greenhouse gas emissions. Revenue earned from the carbon tax is returned to businesses and households through rebates, ensuring that the cost of the tax does not burden these entities. (“Annex: Pricing Carbon Pollution”)
Criticism
Criticism surrounding the tax has focused mainly on rising living costs for households and businesses. Conservative leader Pierre Poilievre has periodically argued against the carbon tax, challenging its effectiveness. As such, alternative policies to reduce carbon emissions could be considered through developing clean energy technology, as Poilievre suggests (Wherry).
The Significance
The carbon tax in Canada set a precedent for using economic variables to support environmental aims. If continuously implemented, the tax could be a critical step towards reducing greenhouse gas emissions nationwide, ultimately contributing to the fight against climate change.
References
AI Statement: OpenAI’s language tools were used to generate synonyms, correct grammatical issues, and adjust sentence structure, ensuring greater clarity for the reader
Government of Canada. “Pan-Canadian Framework on Clean Growth and Climate Change.” Last updated April 2, 2024. https://www.canada.ca/en/services/environment/weather/cli atechange/pan-canadian-framework.html
Government of Canada. “Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act: Annual Report for 2019.” Last updated June 5, 2023. https://www.canada.ca/en/environment-climate-change/services/climate-change/pricing-pollution-how-it-will-work/greenhouse-gas-annual-report-2019.html
Government of Canada. “Annex: Pricing Carbon Pollution.” Last updated April 2, 2024. https://www.canada.ca/en/services/environment/weather/climatechange/climate-plan/climate-plan-overview/healthy-environment-healthy-economy/annex-pricing-carbon-pollution.html
Wherry, Aaron. “The carbon tax has its critics — do any of them have better ideas?” CBC News, 20 Mar. 2024. https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/carbon-tax-climate-change-poilievre-trudeau-1.7148327
Brown v. Board of Education: Downfall of the "Separate but Equal" Doctrine
Aadil Monir - June 9th, 2024
Case Summary
In 1954, Mr. Oliver Brown and several other parents sought to enroll their children in a nearby school reserved for white students in Topeka, Kansas. Their children were denied admission solely based on their race, forcing them to travel long distances to a segregated school despite living closer to the designated white one. In response, Mr. Brown, along with twelve other parents, filed a lawsuit against the Topeka School Board. They argued that racial segregation in public schools violated the 14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, which guarantees equal protection under the law (National Archives).
When the case reached the Federal District Court of Kansas, the court acknowledged the harmful impact of segregation. Still, it upheld the separate but equal doctrine established in Plessy V. Ferguson, which defended racial segregation. This was justified by stating that the facilities offered in non-white schools were comparable to white schools, hence “separate but equal.” However, Mr. Brown and the other plaintiffs did not give up after the court ruled in favour of the school district and appealed directly to the U.S. Supreme Court seeking justice (Quimbee).
The Significance
After hearing the plaintiff’s arguments, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that racial segregation in public schools was unconstitutional. The court delivered a unanimous ruling, stating that the “separate but equal” doctrine violated the principles of the equal protection clause in the 14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. As a result, this ruling mandated the desegregation of public schools across the nation, setting a landmark precedent for future civil rights movements (National Archives; Quimbee).
References
AI Statement: OpenAI’s language tools were used to generate synonyms, correct grammatical issues, and adjust sentence structure, ensuring greater clarity for the reader
National Archives. “Brown v. Board of Education.” Accessed June 9, 2024. https://www.archives.gov/milestone-documents/brown-v-board-of-education
Quimbee. “Brown v. Board of Education (Brown I).” Accessed June 9, 2024. https://www.quimbee.com/cases/brown-v-board-of-education-brown-i